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NOTE
At the Edge of Objectivity: The Missouri
Court of Appeals’ Deference to a Seemingly
Subjective Assessment of Prejudice Under
Strickland
Dawson v. State, No. WD 82441, 2020 WL 3966847 (Mo. App. W.D. July 14,
2020), reh'g and/or transfer denied (Aug. 27, 2020)
Bradley J. Isbell*

I. INTRODUCTION
Strickland v. Washington is often heralded as one of the most
important criminal procedure cases of the last century.1 The opinion
created a two-prong framework for analyzing a post-conviction relief
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: performance and prejudice.2
The focus of this Note is the prejudice prong, specifically when the postconviction court is the same court that presided over a defendant’s trial or
sentencing.
Imagine an inmate’s post-conviction counsel argues that the
defendant received ineffective assistance before the trial court because

*

B.S., University of Arkansas, 2015; M.S., University of Arkansas, 2017; J.D.
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri
Law Review, 2020-2021, Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 20212022. I am grateful to Professor Litton for his insight, guidance, and support during
the writing of this Note, the talented attorneys in the Criminal Appeals Division of the
Missouri Attorney General’s Office for introducing me to this topic, as well as the
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Adam N. Steinman,
Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1947, 1967 n.109 (2017).
2. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As explained in more detail infra, the first prong,
performance, regards the actual assistance provided by legal counsel. The prejudice
prong evaluates what impact, if any, counsel’s deficient performance had on the
outcome of the proceeding.
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trial counsel failed to present readily available, mitigating evidence.3
Under Strickland’s second prong, post-conviction counsel must argue that
trial counsel’s failure caused prejudice: a reasonable probability exists that
the unpresented evidence would have resulted in a shorter sentence.4 How
should the post-conviction court assess whether the evidence would have
resulted in a shorter sentence? In the event that the post-conviction court
is the same as the sentencing court, should the court simply ask a
subjective question: is there a reasonable probability that it would have
imposed a shorter sentence? Conversely, should the post-conviction court
divorce its inquiry from its role at sentencing and engage in an objective
inquiry: is there a reasonable probability that the evidence would have
resulted in a shorter sentence from an impartial, fair court? Reading
Strickland in light of its specific facts seemingly foreclosed this decision
in favor of objectivity.5
However, in Dawson v. State, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District, came to the opposite conclusion.6 The court entertained
an appeal from a motion court’s7 rejection of a motion for post-conviction
relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, where the motion court
also presided over the appellant’s sentencing.8 In line with its approach
for the last decade, the Western District took the subjective approach.9 It
gave special deference to the lower court’s prejudice analysis under
Strickland precisely because that court would presumably know whether
trial counsel’s alleged failures would have altered its sentencing
decision.10 In fact, the Court of Appeals stated that a post-conviction
court’s prejudice analysis in such a circumstance is “virtually
unchallengeable.”11
Part II of this Note details the facts and holding from Dawson v. State,
with particular attention to the court’s analysis of prejudice under the

3. Mitigating evidence is evidence that is presented by defense counsel during
the sentencing phase of a capital trial that suggests that the defendant should be
sentenced to life in prison rather than death. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
114–15 (1982).
4. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
5. Id. at 700–01.
6. Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
7. A motion court is the lower court that originally hears a motion for postconviction relief.
8. Id. at 763.
9. See id. at 768.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 769 (quoting Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010)).
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Strickland standard. Part III provides the legal context in which Dawson
was decided. This includes identifying the source of the Strickland
standard, as well as its interpretation in both federal and Missouri state
courts. Part IV discusses the reasoning behind the prejudice analysis in
Dawson, including Judge Alok Ahuja’s concurrence, which draws
attention to potential weaknesses in the majority’s reasoning, given the
context in which Strickland was decided. Part V provides commentary on
Dawson, noting the difficulty in applying Strickland’s prejudice prong
when the post-conviction court also presided over the underlying criminal
case. It also contemplates the appropriateness of such an arrangement.
Part VI concludes and provides suggestions for further research.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On November 16, 2015, Gabriel Dawson was placed on probation by
the juvenile division of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri
for several acts of juvenile delinquency.12 On May 17, 2016, Dawson
participated in a robbery, during which an accomplice to the robbery
died.13 After the robbery, the juvenile division of the prosecutor’s office
filed a motion to prosecute Dawson as an adult, and the juvenile court
granted the motion.14 Dawson was then charged with the class B felony
of attempted first-degree robbery.15 On October 6, 2016, at the age of
sixteen, Gabriel Dawson pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree robbery
for the crime committed on May 17, 2016, in exchange for the prosecutor
agreeing not to seek felony murder charges.16 Dawson’s plea and
sentencing hearings were before Judge Patrick K. Robb, of the Circuit
Court of Buchanan County, Missouri.
During Dawson’s sentencing hearing, the trial court questioned him
about his understanding of the plea process.17 He affirmed that he
understood that he was facing a range of punishment of up to fifteen years
with no probation.18 Dawson also affirmed that no one had promised him
a particular sentence in exchange for his plea.19 The sentencing court
found that Dawson’s plea was made voluntarily and knowingly.20 On
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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December 12, 2016, the court sentenced Dawson to fourteen years in the
custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. 21 After the sentence
was announced, Dawson confirmed to the sentencing court that he was
satisfied with the legal representation that he had received from plea
counsel.22
Dawson then timely filed a pro se motion to vacate, amend, or set
aside his sentence under Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 24.035.23 The
court appointed post-conviction counsel to Dawson, who then filed an
amended complaint on his behalf.24 The amended motion claimed that
Dawson was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing because
(1) plea counsel, who also represented Dawson at sentencing, failed to
investigate and present mitigating evidence of adolescent development at
Dawson’s sentencing hearing; and (2) plea counsel failed to investigate
and present mitigating evidence from Dawson’s family members and
weightlifting coach at Dawson’s sentencing hearing.25 The amended
motion claimed that Dawson was prejudiced by both of plea counsel’s
alleged failures because there was a reasonable probability that, but for
them, he would have received a lesser sentence.26
Dawson’s post-conviction proceedings, including an evidentiary
hearing, were before Judge Robb, who also presided over Dawson’s
underlying criminal plea and sentencing proceedings.27 At the evidentiary
hearing, a neuropsychologist testified regarding adolescent brain behavior
generally, as well as regarding her personal evaluation of Dawson when
he was seventeen.28 Dawson’s mother, grandmother, great-aunt, and
weightlifting coach each testified to Dawson’s character.29 Conversely,
Dawson’s plea counsel testified that Dawson told her he wanted to take
responsibility for his actions during sentencing and that she had advised
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(b) (“A person seeking relief pursuant to this Rule
24.035 shall file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence . . .
The motion shall be filed no earlier than the date the sentence is entered if no appeal
is taken, including if no appeal is taken after any remand of the judgment or sentence
following a prior appeal, or the date the mandate of the appellate court issues affirming
the judgment or sentence.”).
24. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 764.
25. Id. at 764–65. The amended motion also claimed that Dawson’s right to due
process was violated because the sentencing court failed to consider him for dual
juvenile/criminal jurisdiction under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.073. Id. at 764.
26. Id. at 764–65.
27. Id. at 761–63.
28. Id. at 765.
29. Id.
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against hiring an expert to testify to Dawson’s mental development.30 Plea
counsel also testified that Dawson told her he did not want his mother to
testify at his sentencing hearing, and that the weightlifting coach was
contacted but was unavailable to testify at the sentencing hearing.31
The motion court, the venue where a motion for post-conviction relief
(“PCR”) is heard,32 denied Dawson’s Rule 24.035 motion for PCR,
concluding that even if plea counsel had presented at sentencing the
mitigating evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, Dawson would
not have received a shorter sentence.33 The Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District, heard the case on appeal and upheld the judgment of the
motion court.34 It found that the motion court’s conclusion that
Strickland’s prejudice prong was not met was objectively reasonable and
not clearly erroneous.35 The court reasoned that, based on its own
precedent, where the motion court had the benefit of also being the
sentencing court “the motion court’s ruling as to the impact of character
witnesses” at sentencing is “virtually unchallengeable,” indicating
deference to a seemingly subjective analysis of prejudice below.36

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This section first discusses the origins of the Strickland standard in
the United States Supreme Court. Next, it examines the application of
Strickland’s prejudice prong in Missouri state courts. Finally, it presents
decisions from United States Courts of Appeals to illustrate Strickland’s
interpretation and application in federal courts.

30. Id. at 770.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Id. at 763 (“Specifically, Mr. Gabriel Knight Dawson (“Dawson”)
appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Missouri
(“motion court”), denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief after an
evidentiary hearing.”). In Missouri, the motion court is often the same as the trial
court, the court where the underlying criminal conviction occurred. See, e.g., id.
(“[This appeal] also involves a procedural scenario in which the sentencing court and
the post-conviction relief motion court are one and the same.”).
33. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 771.
34. Id. at 772.
35. Id. at 768, 772.
36. Id. at 771.
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A. Origins of the Strickland Standard
The framework for analyzing a post-conviction claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel was set forth in the Supreme Court of the United
States’s seminal decision in Strickland v. Washington.37 In Strickland, the
Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to
criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel.38 This
right is violated both when the Government denies a defendant access to
counsel, and when counsel’s own deficient performance denies a
defendant “adequate legal assistance.”39 The Supreme Court established
a two-prong test for analyzing a post-conviction claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, colloquially known as the “Strickland standard.”40
First, a movant must show that counsel’s performance was objectively
deficient.41 Second, a movant must show that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the movant.42 If a movant fails to show either
prong, “it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted
from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable.”43
The first prong of the Strickland standard, the performance prong,
governs the performance of defense counsel.44 The Supreme Court held
that the applicable threshold required to ensure a fair trial is that of
“reasonably effective assistance.”45 This requires a movant to show
specific acts or omissions by defense counsel that do not fall within the
scope of reasonable professional judgment.46 The motion court must then
judge the reasonableness of defense counsel’s challenged conduct in light
of the facts of the case at the time of the alleged acts or omissions. 47
Strickland demands that motion courts begin their evaluation with a strong
presumption that defense counsel’s assistance was effective and that the
challenged actions resulted from “reasonable professional judgment.”48

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–700 (1984).
Id. at 684–86.
Id. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
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Further, Strickland sets out that strategic choices made by counsel after an
investigation of law and facts are “virtually unchallengeable.”49
The second prong of the Strickland standard, much like a plain error
review, requires a movant to show that he or she was prejudiced by defense
counsel’s deficient performance.50 The movant must show a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors.51 Strickland requires that an
assessment of prejudice “should proceed on the assumption that the
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the
standards that govern the decision” of guilt of sentencing.52 The Supreme
Court explained that this objective approach entails excluding the
“idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker,” including the particular
judge’s sentencing practices.53
In the underlying criminal case, Washington waived his right to an
advisory jury during the sentencing phase.54 The trial judge found that the
aggravating factors in the case outweighed the mitigating factors and
sentenced Washington to death.55 After Washington unsuccessfully
exhausted his PCR claims in Florida’s state court system, he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel for – among other things – trial counsel’s
alleged failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence
at sentencing.56 The district court held an evidentiary hearing on
Washington’s claims.57 The trial judge from Washington’s criminal
proceeding testified that even if trial counsel had presented additional
mitigating evidence, it would not have affected the sentence the trial judge
imposed.58 Relying in part on this testimony, the district court denied
Washington’s petition because it found no reasonable probability that the
alleged errors by trial counsel affected the outcome of sentencing.59 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and

49. Id.
50. Id. at 691–92.
51. Id. at 691–92.
52. Id. at 695.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 672. Under Florida’s capital sentencing scheme in place at the time, a
defendant had the right to an advisory jury during the sentencing phase of trial,
although the ultimate sentencing decision rested with the judge. Id.
55. Id. at 678–79.
56. Id. at 678.
57. Id. at 679.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 683.
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remanded the case, and petitioner, the State of Florida, filed a petition for
a writ of certiorari.60
To illustrate the objective approach to determining prejudice, the
Supreme Court applied this newly minted standard to the facts of
Washington’s claim. 61 The Court made clear that its conclusion that
Washington’s claim did not meet either the performance or the prejudice
prong did “not depend on the trial judge’s testimony at the District Court
hearing,” and that “that testimony [was] irrelevant to the prejudice
inquiry.”62
In 2007, and in the wake of Strickland, the Supreme Court heard
Schriro v. Landrigan, another claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.63
In Landrigan, the defendant, Landrigan, filed a petition for PCR following
a sentence of death for capital murder.64 The same judge who sentenced
Landrigan to death presided over the post-conviction court that heard his
petition.65 Landrigan’s petition was denied by the post-conviction court
without an evidentiary hearing because the record clearly showed that his
counsel’s performance was not deficient—the first prong of Strickland.66
On review, the Supreme Court held that the motion court’s determination
of the facts was reasonable and noted that because the judge presiding over
the post-conviction court also presided over the underlying criminal case,
she was “ideally situated” to assess the factual record of the underlying
case.67 Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, agreed that some special
deference was owed to the post-conviction court’s interpretation of the
sentencing transcript.68

B. Strickland Applied in Missouri State Courts
In Missouri state courts, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is properly brought as a motion for PCR pursuant to either Missouri Rule
of Civil Procedure 24.035 or 29.15.69 Under either rule, the motion court

60. Id. at 698–99.
61. Id. at 698–99.
62. Id. at 700.
63. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
64. Id. at 469–71.
65. Id. at 471.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 476.
68. Id. at 495 (Steven, J., dissenting).
69. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035 (providing an avenue for postconviction relief
following a guilty plea); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 (providing an avenue for
postconviction relief following a felony conviction by a judge or jury).
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is required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, whether or not
an evidentiary hearing is held.70 Both rules limit appellate review of a
motion court’s ruling to “a determination of whether the findings and
conclusion of the trial court are clearly erroneous.”71 In the context of
reviewing the prejudice prong of claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a line of precedent in the Southern and Western Districts of the
Missouri Court of Appeals has emerged that conflicts with Strickland’s
framework of objectivity.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing following
a guilty plea was first brought before the Missouri Court of Appeals in
2009, when the Southern District, heard Joos v. State.72 In Joos¸ the
movant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move
to dismiss certain venirepersons for apparent bias.73 The motion court
concluded that this failure could not have prejudiced the movant because
the venirepersons in question were excused for other reasons and did not
ultimately sit on the movant’s jury.74 In affirming the motion court’s
decision, the Southern District concluded that the motion court’s findings
“carry special weight” because the motion court had also been the trial
court in the underlying criminal case.75 This statement was supported by
citations to several past decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri and
Missouri Court of Appeals, which discussed a trial court being in the best
position to control voir dire because it can see and hear potential jurors
respond to questioning.76 However, each of the cited cases concerned a
direct appeal with a claim of trial court error, not a PCR proceeding.77
Therefore, none of the cases that the Joos court relied on dealt with an

70. Id. at 24.035(j).
71. Id. at 24.035(k).
72. Joos v. State, 277 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
73. Id. at 804. A venireperson is a member of an entire panel from which a jury
is drawn. Venire, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
74. Joos, 277 S.W.3d at 804.
75. Id. at 804–05.
76. Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 166 S.W.3d 599, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005))
(concluding that the trial court is “in the best position to determine the impact of a
juror’s statement upon other members of the panel.”); State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9,
19 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (acknowledging broad discretion for a trial court’s
determination of whether a jury panel should be dismissed); State v. Evans, 802
S.W.2d 507, 514 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (acknowledging broad discretion for a trial
court’s determination of whether a jury panel should be dismissed).
77. State v. Taylor, 166 S.W.3d 599, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Smulls, 935
S.W.2d at 17; Evans, 802 S.W.2d at 510.
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application of Strickland because they were not claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.78
A year later, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District heard
Cherco v. State, which was the first time a Missouri Court of Appeals
showed special deference to the prejudice determination of a motion court
that was also the sentencing court in the underlying criminal case.79 In
Cherco, the Western District relied on the Supreme Court of Missouri’s
interpretation of the prejudice analysis defined in Strickland.80 The court
held that in such a circumstance, a movant must show that but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the movant would have received a lesser
sentence.81 The Cherco court determined that the motion court’s
conclusion that there was no reasonable probability that additional
mitigation evidence would have resulted in a lesser sentence for the
movant was not clearly erroneous.82 The court noted that, “[H]ere, the
sentencing court and the motion court are one in the same, rendering a
motion court’s finding that character witnesses would not have
ameliorated the sentence virtually unchallengeable under the clearly
erroneous standard.”83
In Scroggins v. State, the Western District again acknowledged a
heightened degree of deference to a motion court hearing a PCR claim
when that court also presided over the underlying criminal case. In that
case, however, deference was given to the motion court’s review of the
record, and not its determination of prejudice.84 In Scroggins, the motion
court denied Scroggins’s motion for PCR.85 On review, the Western
District noted that the motion court was particularly well situated to review
the facts from the underlying record and the motion for PCR because the
motion court was also the sentencing court.86 While the motion court
determined that the facts did not support a possible finding of prejudice,

78. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
79. Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 828, 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
80. Id. at 828 (citing Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc) (holding that Strickland prejudice requires a showing that “but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
(emphasis added)).
81. Id. at 830–31.
82. Id. at 831.
83. Id.
84. Scroggins v. State, 596 S.W.3d 163, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020).
85. Id. In Missouri, a movant seeking PCR is only entitled to an evidentiary
hearing if the motion alleges facts that are not disputed by the record which, if true,
would warrant relief. Patterson v. State, 576 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).
86. Scroggins, 596 S.W.3d at 168.
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which should have implicated the objective analysis detailed in Strickland,
the language used by the Western District was more akin to the United
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Landrigan.87 Like Landrigan, here the
motion for PCR was denied without an evidentiary hearing.88 The
appellate court’s review, therefore, was limited to determining whether the
motion court’s determination that the facts alleged in Scroggins’s PCR
motion would not warrant relief if true was clearly erroneous, as opposed
to conducting a full Strickland analysis of the merits of the PCR claim
following an evidentiary hearing.89 Consequently, the heightened
deference given here may not conflict with Strickland in the way that
language in Joos, Cherco, and Dawson does.90
Both the Southern and Western Districts of the Missouri Court of
Appeals have recognized this special degree of deference to a motion court
that also served as the trial court in the underlying criminal case.91
However, the Supreme Court of Missouri has yet to address this issue.

C. Interpretations of Strickland in Federal Circuit Courts
Several federal circuit courts have confronted the Strickland issue,
each concluding that Strickland requires an objective, not subjective,
analysis of prejudice.92 In Sealey v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison,
a movant’s post-conviction counsel presented an affidavit at the movant’s
PCR hearing from a juror in the defendant’s underlying criminal case.93
The juror stated that if additional mitigating evidence about the
defendant’s family had been presented during sentencing, it would have
made a difference in the juror’s decision.94 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit still held that it was reasonable for the

87. Id.
88. Id. at 163.
89. Id. at 165; see also Patterson, 576 S.W.3d at 243.
90. See Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020); Cherco v. State,
309 S.W.3d 819, 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Joos v. State, 277 S.W.3d 802 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009).
91. See Scroggins, 596 S.W.3d at 168; Goodwater v. State, 560 S.W.3d 44, 55
(Mo. Ct. App. 2018); McKee v. State, 540 S.W.3d 451, 458–59 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018);
Noland v. State, 413 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
92. Sealey v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1358 (11th Cir.
2020); Garner v. Lee, 908 F.3d 845, 862 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1608
(2019); Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1344 (11th Cir. 2008); White v. Ryan, 895
F.3d 641, 670 (9th Cir. 2018).
93. Sealey, 954 F.3d at 1358.
94. Id.
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state court to conclude that the defendant did not prove prejudice because
the prejudice “inquiry under Strickland is an objective one.”95
The Eleventh Circuit faced the same issue in Williams v. Allen, where
the same judge who sentenced the defendant to death in the underlying
criminal proceedings also presided over the defendant’s PCR
proceedings.96 In his PCR motion, the defendant raised a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing for a failure to present
mitigation evidence.97 The judge found no reasonable probability that the
additional mitigation evidence would have changed the sentence he
imposed.98 On review, the Eleventh Circuit held that “a trial judge’s posthoc statements concerning how additional evidence might have affected
its ruling are not determinative for purposes of assessing prejudice.”99 The
court concluded that the defendant in fact did prove prejudice, reversing
the district court’s ruling.100
In Garner v. Lee, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reviewed the United State District Court for the Eastern District of
New York’s grant of habeas corpus for a defendant’s post-conviction
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.101 In its ruling, the lower court
concluded that the prejudicial impact of potentially inadmissible evidence
was apparent from post-trial statements made by jurors to the media.102
The Second Circuit noted that “to the extent the district court relied on a
juror’s post-trial statements to evaluate Strickland prejudice, . . . the
district court committed error.”103 The court further expounded that the
proper focus of a prejudice inquiry is “the reliability of the result, from an
objective viewpoint,” so evidence about the actual decision-making
process should not be considered.104 After reviewing the record de novo,
the Second Circuit concluded that the state court did not err in finding no
prejudice and therefore vacated the district court’s grant of habeas
corpus.105

95. Id.
96. Williams, 542 F.3d at 1344.
97. Id. at 1331–32.
98. Id. at 1344–45.
99. Id. at 1345.
100. Id.
101. Garner v. Lee, 908 F.3d 845, 862 (2d Cir. 2018).
102. Garner v. Lee, No. 2:11-CV-00007 (PKC), 2016 WL 7223335 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 13, 2016), vacated and remanded, 908 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 2018).
103. Garner, 908 F.3d at 862.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 871.
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In White v. Ryan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit faced a similar issue of a post-conviction court applying a
subjective prejudice standard.106 The court presiding over the defendant’s
post-conviction proceedings was not the same as the sentencing court.107
However, the post-conviction court assessed Strickland’s prejudice prong
by answering whether it would have imposed a different sentence, given
the additional mitigation evidence presented in the post-conviction
hearing.108 On review, the Ninth Circuit found that the post-conviction
court’s prejudice determination was improper.109 It held that Strickland
requires the post-conviction court to consider “the likelihood of a different
result not just by the trial court but by an appellate court that
‘independently reweighs the evidence.’”110
This line of holdings in federal circuit courts illustrates how the
Western and Southern Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals have
misapplied Strickland’s prejudice prong by considering input from the
decisionmaker from the underlying criminal case.111

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Dawson, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, found
that the motion court’s conclusion that Dawson failed to satisfy
Strickland’s prejudice prong was objectively reasonable.112 The court
stated that, even if plea counsel had presented the additional mitigating
evidence at Dawson’s sentencing hearing, Dawson would not have
received a lower sentence. 113 The mitigating evidence that Dawson
complained was omitted had already largely been presented to the
sentencing court either through the sentencing assessment report or
because it was common knowledge for a judge familiar with juvenile
cases.114

106. White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 670 (9th Cir. 2018).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 671 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)).
111. See, e.g., White, 895 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Garner v. Lee, 908
F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 2018).
112. Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). Because the
prejudice prong was not met, the performance prong was not addressed. See id.
113. Id. at 771.
114. Id.
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However, the Dawson court did not stop at crediting the motion
court’s objective analysis of Strickland’s prejudice prong.115 The court
then identified the procedural circumstances of the case: that the motion
court also served as the sentencing court in the underlying criminal case.116
Citing Cherco, the court described the “benefit” of such a circumstance,
where a subjective analysis of the prejudicial impact of additional
mitigating evidence is possible.117 Specifically, the court stated that where
circumstances allow for such subjective review, the motion court’s ruling
is “virtually unchallengeable.”118 Accordingly, the court held that the
motion court’s finding that Strickland’s prejudice prong had not been met
was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the motion court’s judgment.119
Writing in concurrence, Judge Ahuja agreed with the majority’s
conclusion that Dawson failed to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.120
Judge Ahuja then highlighted the majority’s dictum, in which it noted that
special deference was given to this motion court’s prejudice determination
because the motion court was also the sentencing court.121 His
concurrence then proceeded to cite every decision in which a Missouri
court of appeals had relied on this construction of Strickland.122 Judge
Ahuja then explained how Strickland’s prejudice prong required an
objective inquiry, not a subjective analysis of how additional mitigation
evidence would have affected the decision of a particular judge or jury,
noting that Strickland itself made this point “crystal clear” when it
disregarded testimony by the sentencing judge as irrelevant.123 Next,
Judge Ahuja provided support for his interpretation of Strickland’s
prejudice prong with United States Courts of Appeals opinions holding
that a subjective analysis of prejudice was an erroneous application of
Strickland.124
Finally, Judge Ahuja conceded that the majority’s seemingly
erroneous application of Strickland may have little practical effect when
reviewing a motion court’s denial of PCR based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.125 Missouri’s indeterminate sentencing regime
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)).
Id.
Id. at 772.
Id. (Ahuja, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 773–74.
Id. at 774.
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allows broad discretion to sentencing courts and grants them great
deference on appellate review.126 Also, Missouri Supreme Court Rules
24.035 and 29.15 allow overturning a motion court’s denial of PCR only
if the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly
erroneous.127 Like the majority opinion, Judge Ahuja concluded that it is
unlikely a motion court’s decision that there was no reasonable probability
that additional mitigation evidence would have affected sentencing will be
reversed, even under a correct application of Strickland.128 However, the
high bar for proving prejudice established by Strickland is hardly reason
for a reviewing court to raise the bar higher in cases where Strickland was
arguably not applied correctly below.

V. COMMENT
The standard being followed in the Western District is in stark
contrast to the objective prejudice analysis mandated by Strickland and
adhered to in federal courts.129 The plain language used in Dawson shows
that the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, is affording special
deference to a motion court’s subjective opinion that additional mitigating
evidence would not have changed a movant’s sentence.130 Moreover, in
doing so, the Dawson court relied on its own precedent which recognized
the importance of such a subjective analysis.131 This application of
Strickland’s prejudice prong highlights an apparent split among the
Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals, the difficulty of applying
Strickland in a discretionary sentencing scheme, and the potential
difficulties of requiring a trial court to objectively review its own prior
decision.132

A. Split Among Missouri Courts of Appeals Districts
The key to a prejudice analysis under Strickland is objectivity.133 The
Court in Strickland provided a perfect illustration of this by disregarding
126. Id.
127. Id.; Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 24.035(k), 29.15(k).
128. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 744 (Ahuja, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 772; Garner v. Lee, 908 F.3d 845, 862 (2d Cir. 2018); Williams v. Allen,
542 F.3d 1326, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 2008); Cherco v. State, 309 S.W.3d 819, 830–831
(Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
130. Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 772 (Ahuja, J., concurring).
131. Id.
132. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–95 (1984).
133. Id. at 695.
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testimony by the sentencing judge about prejudicial effect as irrelevant.134
Judge Ahuja’s concurrence in Dawson highlighted the Western District’s
history of apparent misapplication of Strickland’s prejudice prong by
giving special deference to a motion court’s apparent subjective
determinations.135
It is not clear that the misapplication here is a product of a motion
court’s reliance on its own subjective judgment. The opinion in Dawson
provides no insight into Judge Robb’s basis for concluding that Dawson
failed to demonstrate prejudice.136 What is clear though, is that an
appellate review of the motion court’s determination of prejudice should
give no heightened deference simply because the motion court was also
the sentencing court. Such consideration of “a particular judge’s
sentencing practices” or “idiosyncrasies” is forbidden under Strickland.137
This line of precedent in the Western District is in apparent conflict with
established ineffective assistance of counsel review jurisprudence and is
ripe for correction by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
Furthermore, notably missing from Judge Ahuja’s concurrence is any
case from the Eastern District relying on this erroneous application of
Strickland.138 In fact, the Eastern District has not subscribed to this line of
cases, as it has not explicitly given special deference to a motion court
because it was also the sentencing court in the underlying criminal case.
This apparent split of authority between the Eastern District and the
Southern and Western District of Missouri’s Court of Appeals provides
further reason for the Supreme Court of Missouri to address this issue.

B. Difficulty in applying Strickland in a Discretionary Sentencing
Scheme
In true Strickland fashion, Judge Ahuja’s concurrence in Dawson
questions whether or not the majority’s misapplication of Strickland’s
prejudice prong actually impacts – or prejudices – a review of a motion
court’s decision.139 In fact, United States Supreme Court Justice
O’Connor herself expressed doubt that the precise formulation of a
prejudice standard would impact a reviewing court’s ultimate decision.140
But the difficulty of establishing prejudice under Strickland is a poor
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 700.
Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 772 (Ahuja, J., concurring).
Id. at 772.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 772 (Ahuja, J., concurring).
Id. at 774.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696–97.
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reason to make it a near impossibility by deferring entirely to the motion
court in cases where Strickland was arguably not applied correctly below.
Both Justice O’Connor and Judge Ahuja recognized that the rare case
would occur in which a stricter standard will deny PCR to a movant who
was in fact denied effective assistance of counsel.141 These borderline
cases, though few in number, justify adherence to Strickland’s objective
approach, and the principle of leniency dictates that any variance from this
standard skew in favor of the movant.
There are two factors that present impediments to an objective
analysis of the prejudicial effect of missing mitigating evidence in
Missouri post-conviction proceedings.
First is the discretionary
sentencing scheme that Missouri trial courts employ. 142 The second is that
courts that presided over the underlying criminal proceeding also hear
motions for PCR in the same matter.143
Strickland, though since expanded to apply to non-capital sentencing
proceedings, reviewed alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing during a capital proceeding.144 Justice O’Connor pointed to the
structured adversarial nature and standards of decision in capital
sentencing as important components that enabled an objective review of
counsel’s effectiveness and any resulting prejudice.145 She also cautioned
that a more informal sentencing proceeding with standardless sentencing
discretion might “require a different approach to the definition of
constitutionally effective assistance.”146
Applying Strickland’s prejudice prong to non-capital sentencing
poses two problems.147 First, the relatively unguided sentencing discretion
which judges and juries are afforded makes appellate review of sentencing
decisions particularly difficult when there is no indication in the record of
what factors influenced sentencing.148 Second is the non-discrete choices

141. Id. at 697 (“The difference, however, should alter the merit of an
ineffectiveness claim only in the rarest case.”); Dawson, 611 S.W.3d at 774 (Ahuja,
J., concurring).
142. Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing
System, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 97 (2006).
143. See, e.g., Rowland v. State, 605 S.W.3d 125, 127–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)
(“The same judge who presided over the two trials involving the underlying charges
against Movant also served as the PCR motion court.”).
144. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 686.
147. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV.
1069, 1087 (2009).
148. Id. at 1087–88.
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available in non-capital sentencing.149 While a capital sentencing
proceeding poses a binary choice for a sentencing court, a non-capital
sentence could be any of a number of years of incarceration, probation,
fines, or a combination of any of those options.150 These two concerns
have led to much criticism of Strickland as applied to non-capital
sentencing.151
However, these criticisms are not without pushback. Capital
sentencing also allows for discretion in sentencing, and judges and juries
in capital trials are not always required to provide reasoning for their
decisions.152 This makes the distinction between capital and non-capital
cases less meaningful in the context of applying Strickland.153 Further, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that when it comes to prejudice, any
amount of actual jail time is significant.154 Therefore, on collateral review,
the seemingly non-discrete nature of non-capital sentencing comes down
to a binary question: did deficient performance add any time to the
movant’s sentence? This leaves a much simpler question for an objective
inquiry to answer, much like that answered in a capital case. With both
obstacles overcome, any justification for deviating from Strickland’s
objective approach is much less convincing.

C. Applying Strickland When the Sentencer is the Reviewer
Even if the general concerns of applying Strickland’s prejudice prong
to non-capital sentencing were alleviated, it does not resolve the issue
presented in Dawson.155 The question faced is whether it is appropriate to
give heightened deference to a motion court’s prejudice determination
when it is engaged in a collateral review of its own prior sentencing
decision under a standard that demands objectivity.
Common sense seems to suggest that the sentencing court would be
in the best position to determine the prejudicial effect that missing
mitigating evidence had on a movant’s sentencing proceeding.156 The
Supreme Court itself acknowledged as much in Landrigan when it noted
149. Id. at 1089.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1079.
152. Id. at 1087–88.
153. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984).
154. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001).
155. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686–87; Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 772 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2020) (Ahuja, J., concurring).
156. See Ty Alper, ‘So What?’: Using Reverse Investigation to Articulate
Prejudice and Win Post-Conviction Claims, Champion, December 2011, at 46.
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that the post-conviction court was “ideally situated” to assess the record
from the underlying criminal case because the same judge presided over
both sentencing and post-conviction proceedings.157 This impulse is likely
driven by the aforementioned concerns about applying Strickland to a noncapital sentencing proceeding in the first place.158 The judge who presided
over sentencing should know exactly what factors affected the movant’s
sentence, how those factors would interact with additional mitigating
evidence, and whether or not the additional evidence would have
shortened the sentence handed down.159
Strickland forecloses the use of such subjectivity in a prejudice
analysis.160 How then can a motion court, inherently bestowed with such
insight into sentencing, be asked to ignore it and review its own prior
decision objectively? The thought experiment is taxing. A motion court
with the “benefit” of also being the sentencing court must hear the new
mitigating evidence raised in a post-conviction motion, ignore all of its
own “idiosyncrasies” and disregard as irrelevant any thought or memory
about its own “actual process of decision” or “sentencing practices.”161
Granted, Strickland tells us to assume that a judge acted according to the
law;162 however, even taking that as given, the question still exists in a
discretionary sentencing scheme what sentencing practices a motion court
should rely on, if not its own.163
Strickland would seem to require such a court to consider the
prejudicial effect through the lens of a hypothetical reasonable,
conscientious, and impartial decisionmaker.164 However, Strickland just
told us that both the motion court and the sentencing court should be
assumed to be such.165 So, a motion court is left with the task of becoming
157. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 476 (2007). But that comment was
specifically directed toward the post-conviction court’s determination of facts in
deciding to deny an evidentiary hearing. Id.
158. See supra Section V.B.
159. Hessick, supra note 147, at 1089.
160. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
161. Dawson v. State, 611 S.W.3d 761, 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020); Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695.
162. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
163. Id. at 694. This leaves unaddressed an equal (or perhaps greater) concern that
a sentencing court, that felt it had shown leniency at sentencing, might be frustrated
by the appearance of a particular defendant’s motion for PCR on its already crowded
docket. Id. Such a circumstance strains the reasonableness of the assumption that the
motion court will attempt in good faith an objective review of prejudice in its own
prior proceeding.
164. Id. at 695.
165. Id.
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some hypothetical, reasonable, conscientious, and impartial
decisionmaker – other than itself – to determine what this hypothetical
decisionmaker would do if it were in the position that the motion court is
actually in. Reliance on such a system seems to question the very
necessity of appellate courts in our judicial system.

VI. CONCLUSION
An analysis of prejudice under Strickland requires objective review.
The precedent of the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals is
seemingly in conflict with this mandate by giving heightened deference
when a motion court is able to engage in a subjective review. This
precedent is also seemingly in conflict with the approach of the Eastern
and Southern Districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals. Therefore,
Dawson presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court of Missouri to rule
on an issue that is ripe for review.
Further, this tension in Dawson highlights the difficulty that the
Strickland standard of prejudice presents when a motion court is reviewing
a case that it presided over as a sentencing court. The plain language of
Strickland requires the motion court to assume that it followed the law
when it made its earlier decision at sentencing.166 Strickland then requires
the motion court to forget its own sentencing practices and any process of
decision that it might remember from the underlying case. The motion
court must instead reweigh all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence
now available and rule as if it were some other hypothetical, impartial
decisionmaker.
This mental exercise stretches the limits of the assumption that a
motion court will be able to follow the Strickland standard in making its
decision. It also begs the question of whether a motion court should be
able to hear a PCR claim when it also presided over the underlying
criminal case. Such a question presents an avenue for future research to
determine which jurisdictions allow such a practice. Also of interest
would be the deference given to the motion court’s analysis of prejudice
by the appellate courts of those jurisdictions.

166. Id.
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